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The Impact of the U.S. Antitrust and
Related Laws on the International Marketing of
Goods and Services (Export and Import)
by Thomas E. Johnson*
I. Introduction
Conscientious businessmen and attorneys have become familiar
with the U.S. antitrust laws as they are applied to domestic transactions.
Whether by formal education or in the "school of hard knocks" they
have learned the pervasive reach of the antitrust laws and the substantial
penalties attached thereto.'
When U.S. businesses become involved in international trade, how-
ever, certain ambiguities arise in the application of the U.S. antitrust
laws which may leave the businessmen with a sense of uncertainty.
Often, the most helpful indicia for determining the application of the
U.S. antitrust laws to an international transaction is to review the domes-
tic precedents as far as they are analagous. Against this more familiar
backdrop, it is easier to understand whether any additional latitude ex-
ists for international transactions or whether they will be treated in the
same way as domestic transactions.
Prior to analyzing specific laws and conduct, however, some general
remarks will be helpful.
A. Efect on United States Foreign Commerce
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2 "every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." (Emphasis added). Substantially identical definitions appear
in section 2 of the Sherman Act 3 and section 1 of the Clayton Act 4 in
* Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Ill.; B.S. 1969, University of Utah; J.D. 1975,
Northwestern University.
I See, e.g., the "parade of the horribles" in J. GARRETr (PLI), ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE:
A LEGAL AND BUSINESS GUIDE, ch. 1 (1978).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
3 Id. § 2.
4 Id. § 12.
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regard to "foreign commerce."
There have been many attempts to clarify exactly what type of ef-
fect on U.S. foreign commerce is required before subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists under the U.S. antitrust laws. The Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, section 18, 5 attempts to
codify one interpretation. This section requires that the effect be "sub-
stantial" and "foreseeable." The United States Department of Justice, in
their 4ntitrust Guide for International Operations,6 the latest comprehensive
statement of their interpretation of the application of the U.S. antitrust
laws to foreign commerce, purportedly adopts these tests. "When foreign
transactions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce,
they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place."' 7 The
Guide does indicate that application of the laws "should avoid unneces-
sary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations."8
In reality, however, the trend of recent years has been increasing
application of the antitrust laws to foreign transactions. In Pacifc Seafar-
ers, Inc. v. Far East Line, Inc.,9 the antitrust laws were applied to the trans-
portation of goods by oceangoing vessels between two foreign ports. The
very recent OPEC case,i ° however, where subject matter jurisdiction was
not found, may indicate that the pendulum has begun to return. The
dissatisfaction of foreign governments with this extension of the U.S. an-
titrust laws has been increasingly expressed. Recent rejection by the gov-
ernment of Great Britain of the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. laws is
instructive. 1
Nevertheless, in many instances the plaintiff will be able to establish
a sufficient effect on United States foreign commerce to apply the laws.
B. Foreign Commerce Antitrust Deviations
There are two general areas, at least, in which the application of the
United States antitrust laws to foreign commerce transactions deviate
from domestic principles. The first is the so-called Webb-Pomerenei 2 ex-
emption, and the second is the parent-subsidiary relationship.
1. Webb-Pomerene Associations. Under the Webb-Pomerene Act,
U.S. export associations are exempt from the application of the U.S. an-
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965).
6 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan.
26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
7 Id. at 6.
8 Id.
9 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
10 International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 62, 868 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
II American Antitrust Law-Britain Says Go Home, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 1979, at 79;
Antitrust: U.K. Government Will Sponsor Btll to Ban Enforcement of US Law in Britain, DAILY RE-
PORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Oct. 15, 1979, at A-6.
12 Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
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titrust laws under certain conditions. Theoretically, this Act would per-
mit the combination of U.S. manufacturers or producers to sell en bloc to
foreign markets. The price of the goods may be fixed and production
limited. ' 3
In actuality, however, the Act has provided little in the way of ex-
emption. First, the association is exempt if, and only if, it does not (1)
artificially or intentionally restrain U.S. domestic trade, (2) affect U.S.
domestic prices, or (3) restrain the export trade of any U.S. competitor of
the association.'
4
In the litigated cases relating to such associations, the courts were
always able to find some adverse effect on a U.S. competitor of the associ-
ation.' 5 Such abuses as exchanging price information with foreign com-
petitors, allocating the U.S. market, restricting U.S. imports, or acting on
behalf of non-members of the association were found to exceed the ex-
emption granted by the Act. An important interpretation made by the
Federal Trade Commission, the agency charged with administration of
the Act, states that "[t]he Act was designed primarily to allow American
exporters to compete more effectively with foreign combinations and car-
tels, not to join them."'1 6 This prohibition of effect on non-member com-
petitors of the association substantially inhibits the exemption.
The second problem with Webb-Pomerene associations is that inevi-
tably one of the members determines that it can be more successful on its
own, and the association breaks down. As a result, as of this date it is
estimated that less than two percent of the total U.S. export trade is ac-
complished through Webb-Pomerene associations.
17
The Department of Justice, in its Guide,18 apparently recognizes the
Webb-Pomerene exemption; however, it emphasizes that an association
must be limited to domestic firms-no agreements of any sort with for-
eign competitors are countenanced. Secondly, the Act applies only to
goods, wares or merchandise, and, therefore, does not exempt service and
licensing transactions. In sum, restrictive interpretation has substantially
emasculated this exemption.' 9
13 See general/, United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950).
14 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976); accord, ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, at 4.
15 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950);
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968), on remand, [1969]
Trade Cases (CCH) 72, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. United States Alkali Export
Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
16 FrC, EXPORT TRADE ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, No. 1-55, July 15, 1955; quotedin [1979]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1314.16.
17 Davidow, US Antitrust and Doing Business Abroad Recent Trends and Developments, 5 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. at 25.
18 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, at 18.
19 Compare the restrictive United States interpretation of the export exemption with the
Export and Import Trading Law of Japan, Law No. 299, Aug. 5, 1952 (as amended), and the
associations thereunder. When an export association is formed pursuant to articles 5 and 11, the
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2. Parent-Subsidiay Relatonships. On several occasions the
United States courts have held that the antitrust laws are applicable to
conspiracies between related domestic corporate entities. In United States
v. Yellow Cab Company,20 the Supreme Court stated:
The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence of an un-
reasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result
as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or inte-
grated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who
are otherwise independent . . . .The corporate interrelationships of the
conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the applicability of
the Sherman Act. 21
Furthermore, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E Seagram & Sons,22 the
Supreme Court stated that common ownership does not liberate corpora-
tions from the impact of the antitrust laws.
Similarly, in the case Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States23
the Court reaffirmed this proposition with respect to the international
sphere. The Court further stated:
It may seem strange to have a conspiracy for the division of territory for
marketing between one corporation and another in which it has a large
or even major interest, but any other conclusion would open wide the
doors for violation of the Sherman Act at home and in foreign fields.
24
Despite this apparently clear statement of the courts, the Depart-
ment of Justice has taken the official position that "a parent corporation
may allocate territories or set prices for the subsidiaries that it fully con-
trols."'25 Full control is considered to be control of a majority of the vot-
ing stock of the subsidiary.
Thus, at least as far as prosecution by the Department of Justice is
concerned, a parent and subsidiary may feel reasonably safe in such con-
duct. This will not necessarily immunize them, however, from attacks by
private antitrust plaintiffs. This distinction leads us to the area of anti-
trust enforcement.
C Antitrust Enforcement
A review of the statistics of the U.S. courts indicates that between
1973 and 1977 the Department of Justice brought approximately fifty to
sixty suits per year to enforce the antitrust laws. 26 These suits, of course,
generally relate to important issues and involve substantial companies.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry may require that all nonmembers also adhere to
the export agreements reached by the association members. Art. 28.
Bills "to promote and encourage the formation and utilization of export trade associations"
are presently pending before Congress. S. 864, 1499, H.R. 5061, CONGRESSIONAL INDEX
(CCH), 96th Cong., 28,216, 28,411 (1979-80).
20 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
21 Id. at 227.
22 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
23 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
24 Id. at 602.
25 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case A at 12.
26 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 99 (2d Supp. 1979).
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As a result, their influence in formulating antitrust precedent is much
greater than the mere number of suits.
On the other hand, between 1973 and 1977 approximately 1100 to
1300 private antitrust suits per year were brought in the federal courts, or
about twenty times the number of government suits. 2 7 This, of course,
emphasizes that the ordinary business may have a great deal more to fear
from private lawsuits by its competitors than by the Department of Jus-
tice. As a result, U.S. businesses engaged in international transactions
must be most sensitive to the effect of their conduct and agreements on
the business opportunities of their U.S. competitors.
Other relatively recent developments add an additional potential
plaintiff to the scene. In Pfer, Inc. v. Government of India,28 the Supreme
Court held that foreign governments have standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act to sue U.S. businesses for treble damages for violations
of the U.S. antitrust laws. Therefore, if a U.S. business is involved in
exporting or selling to a foreign government, it should be aware that the
foreign government may be a potential plaintiff. In the related case of
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,29 the Supreme Court denied the right of a foreign
government to bring aparenspatriae suit on behalf of its citizens for viola-
tions of the U.S. antitrust laws. However, the ratio decidendi of that deci-
sion was that American state governments could not bring such suits,
and, therefore, it was illogical to extend that right to foreign govern-
ments. Subsequent to that decision, however, the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 197630 did extend the right of bringingparenspatriae suits to
state governments. Arguably, Congress' omission of extension of that
right to foreign governments in the Act was an acceptance of the Pftzer,
Inc. v. Lord holding. However, this issue may be raised again now that
the reasoning of the Lord case is no longer applicable.
II. Price Agreements, Including Resale Price Maintenance
The application of the United States antitrust laws in regard to
price agreements in the area of foreign commerce transactions is best an-
alyzed in comparison to the domestic precedents.
A. Domesticaly, Price Fixing Is Illegal Per Se
Domestically, the antitrust laws have been consistently interpreted
to declare both horizontal and vertical price agreements to be illegal per
se.
1 Iorizontal Agreements. Agreements between competitors at
27 Id.
28 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
29 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
30 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)
(1976).
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the same level of trade affecting prices, whether the purpose or effect is to
raise, depress, fix, peg, or stabilize prices are per se illegal. This is so
whether or not the participants possess market control. 3 1
The per se illegality of such activity also encompasses forms of indi-
rect price fixing, such as the exchange of information or the control of
production.32 Recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that the ex-
change of price information, even for the purpose of verifying the quota-
tions of competitors in order to avail oneself of the meeting competition
defense of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, is an indirect form
of price fixing and is prohibited. 3
3
2. VerticalAgreements. Since the repeal of the Fair Trade Laws
by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 34 the Fair Trade exemption
inaugurated in 1937, permitting the fixing of minimum resale prices on
trademarked goods in states permitting such agreements, has been abol-
ished. This repeal reinstated the prior law that agreements between sup-
pliers and customers as to the resale price of the customer were per se
violations of the antitrust laws. 35
It is important here to distinguish the limited holding of Contiental
TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.36 It is well understood that this case in-
volved vertical restrictions. The Court there stated that it was "con-
cerned only with non-price vertical restrictions. The per se illegality of
price restrictions has been established firmly for many years and involves
significantly different questions of analysis and policy. '
3 7
Thus, the Court not only recognized and affirmed the per se illegal-
ity of vertical price restrictions, but specifically indicated that the hold-
ing of Continental TV was limited to non-price vertical restrictions. A
subsequent case, General Beverage Sales Co. v. East Side inery,38 has fol-
lowed this distinction, finding vertical price restrictions outside the limits
of Continental TV.
While it has been held that suggested prices in and of themselves are
not unlawful, 39 when the supplier goes further and refuses to deal, partic-
31 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States v. McKes-
son & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940).
32 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Plymouth Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rent-
als Sys., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan. 1957), af'dpercuriam, 355 U.S. 10 (1957); United States
v. National Container Ass'n, [1940-431 Trade Cases (CCH) 56,028 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); United
States v. Standard Oil of Cal., [1959] Trade Cases (CCH) $ 69,399 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
33 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
34 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3, 89 Stat. 801 (amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1970)).
35 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
36 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
37 Id. at 51 n.18.
38 [1978-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 61,815 (7th Cir. 1978).
39 Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
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ularly by terminating existing dealers for refusal to adhere to suggested
prices, an unlawful refusal to deal will result. 40
B. In Foreign Commerce Price Fixing Will A/most Always Be I/legal
The illegality of price fixing in foreign commerce turns upon the
effect upon United States commerce. Amost always, the requisite effect
will exist and the activity will be illegal under U.S. antitrust laws.
I. Horizontal Agreements. There are three possible combina-
tions of competitors and markets which will be affected by horizontal
price fixing agreements. The first occurs when U.S. and foreign competi-
tors agree to fix prices at which products will be sold in the United States
market by the United States or foreign company. These types of agree-
ments with foreign competitors, or foreign competitors by themselves,
have been held to be per se illegal.4 1 As in the case of domestic agree-
ments, indirect attempts to fix prices by exchanges of information, con-
trol of production, or limitation of imports to the United States, have
been held to be per se illegal.42 This is also the position taken by the
Department of Justice in their Guide.43
The second possible combination occurs when a U.S. company and
another U.S. competitor agree to fix prices at which products will be sold
in foreign markets. As stated above, 44 within the ambit of a Webb-
Pomerene association such activity may be exempt. However, outside of
the protections of such an association, this activity almost always will
have an adverse effect on U.S. foreign commerce and result in per se ille-
gality.45 The deleterious effect is found upon the other U.S. competi-
tors-not the foreign purchaser. In qddition, even if no such effect
existed on U.S. competitors and thus American antitrust laws were not
applicable, such conduct would almost always be a violation of the for-
eign law, with liability resulting if jurisdiction was obtained over the
U.S. businesses in the foreign courts.46
The third possible combination occurs when a U.S. company and a
40 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
41 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modfed
and aJ'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
42 United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cases (CCH) 1 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), ordermodifid, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
43 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case L at 53.
44 See note 13 supra.
45 United States v. International Ore & Fertilizer Corp., No. 64-34 (M.D. Fla. 1964) (case
dismissed); United States v. International Ore & Fertilizer Corp., 63 Cr. No. 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (plea of noto contendere); United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 63
Cr. No. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (plea of nolo contendere). For discussion of these cases, see W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 244 (2d ed. 1973).
46 See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 1, 49 (1958). See cases cited in J. VON
KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION § 5.02 n. 1 (1979).
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foreign competitor agree to fix prices at which products will be sold in
foreign markets. Again, if the requisite effect on U.S. commerce exists,
this conduct will be per se illegal under the U.S. antitrust laws. In the
Timken 47 case and the Alkah "48 case, the requisite adverse effect was found
in the exclusion of exports by the American participant in the agree-
ment, and the exclusion of other American competitors' products from
foreign markets.
2. Vertial Agreements. Vertical price agreements between sup-
pliers and customers in foreign commerce are best analyzed by distin-
guishing between import sales and export sales. In those situations where
the foreign manufacturer or exporter is setting the resale price for the
U.S. distributor (import transactions), such activity will be illegal per
se.4 9 It will be a violation of both the Sherman Act and probably the
Wilson Tariff Act.50
On export transactions, where the U.S. manufacturer or exporter is
setting the resale price of the foreign distributor, the illegality of such
conduct depends upon the effect on U.S. commerce. 5 1 Such an agree-
ment may restrict the selling opportunities of the U.S. manufacturer's or
exporter's competitors in that market. Even if it does not, the American
manufacturer or exporter must beware of liability under foreign law.52
III. Allocation of Markets, Including Exclusive Distributorships
The illegality of the allocation of markets depends upon the plane in
domestic transactions and upon the effect on U.S. commerce and the
market allocated in international transactions.
A. Domestic Allocation of Markets
Domestically, the allocation of markets may be illegal, depending
upon whether the agreement is horizontal between competitors or verti-
cal between the supplier and customer.
Z Horizontal Agreements Are Illegal Per Se. Domestic horizontal
agreements between competitors at the same level of trade to allocate
markets have been held to be illegal per se. 53 This includes the situation
where a supplier appoints a competitor as an exclusive distributor, or
47 See note 23 supra.
48 See note 42 supra.
49 Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., Ltd., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951).
50 15 U.S.C. § 73 (1976).
51 Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) (de mini-
mus effect).
52 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 46, art. 85(1); Deutsch Phillips GmbH, Commission
Decision of Oct. 5, 1973, O.J.L. 293/40; Gero fabriek, Commission Decision of Dec. 22, 1976
(1977), OJ.L. 16/8.
53 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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competitors agree to use the same selling agent. 54
2. Vertical Agreements May Be Lawful. An agreement on the
part of the supplier not to compete with or appoint a competing distribu-
tor in the distributor's territory has been considered to be a reasonably
ancillary restriction, and lawful if the manufacturer is not a monopolist
and competing products are readily available.55 Restrictions imposed by
the manufacturer, not on itself, but upon the distributor not to sell in a
competing distributor's territory, are judged by the rule of reason. 56
Under the holding of Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the court is
required to balance the interbrand and intrabrand competitive effects. 57
Small companies breaking into the market will probably prevail under
such analysis.
Since horizontal allocations of markets are considered illegal per se,
and vertical allocations are either reasonably ancillary or judged under
the rule of reason, it is important that the restraint be a true vertical one,
not a combination of competitors at the same level of trade acting
through a pliant manufacturer or distributor. The Court, in GTE Sylva-
nia specifically excluded such combinations from the rule of reason anal-
ysis announced there.58
B Foreign Commerce Allocation of Markets
In foreign commerce the allocation of markets may be illegal de-
pending upon the market allocated and the effect on U.S. commerce.
1. Horizontal Allocations Depend Upon the Market Allocated and the
Efect on US Commerce. When a U.S. party agrees with a foreign party to
allocate the U.S. market, the courts have unanimously held that such
activity is illegal per se. 59 This also includes the situation where there is a
unilateral or reciprocal appointment of a foreign competitor as the exclu-
sive distributor of the United States party or the agreement to use joint
54 United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
55 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aj'db
an equally dvided court, 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 376 (1967).
56 Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
57 Id. at 57 n.27.
58 Id. at 58 n.28; accord, 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
59 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 322
U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v.
Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114
(S.D. Ohio 1954), aJf'dper curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); modijed, 115
F. Supp. 835 (D.NJ. 1953).
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selling agents. 60
The Department of Justice in its Guide61 indicates that exclusive ap-
pointment of a competitor as a distributor would be prohibited where
the competitor is a substantial potential competitor. However, they do
indicate that if the appointment of the distributor is in an "infant indus-
try," for a short term, and for non-competing products with no implied
agreements not to compete in the competitive products, that such ap-
pointments will not be illegal. 62 This "infant industry" exception paral-
lels the exception recognized by the Court in United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp. in regard to domestic tying.63
Where U.S. and foreign competitors, or foreign competitors only,
allocate foreign markets, as opposed to the U.S. market, the illegality
depends upon the effect on United States commerce. The requisite ad-
verse effect almost always exists due to the limitation of exports of the
U.S. participants in the agreement, and the limitation of export opportu-
nities of the non-participating U.S. competitors. 64
2. Vertical Allocations. As in the case of domestic agreements,
agreements by a U.S. manufacturer or exporter not to compete with, or
appoint a competing distributor in the foreign distributor's foreign terri-
tory, are reasonably ancillary and lawful if the manufacturer is not a
monopolist and competitive products are readily available. 65 This posi-
tion is also recognized by the Department of Justice in its Guide.6 6
Vertically imposed restrictions by the U.S. manufacturer or exporter
on the foreign distributor not to sell in a competing distributor's territory
should be judged under the rule of reason. The Department of Justice in
its Guide, Case J, takes the contrary position that such agreements are
illegal per se under the Schwznn case.6 7 However, the Department does
note that the Continental T, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. case is pending.68
Considering the result in the GTE Sylvania case, it is submitted that Case
J in the Guide needs to be revised and that the Department of Justice
would recognize that the rule of reason analysis mandated there is as
equally applicable to foreign commerce transactions as domestic transac-
60 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
61 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case J at 46.
62 Id. at 47-48.
63 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aJ'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
64 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1949); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
65 United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Key-
stone Watch Case Co., 218 F. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
66 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case J at 46.
67 Id. at 48-49.
68 Id. at 46.
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tions. 69
Where the distributor agrees not to sell back into the United States
market, as opposed to a third country, the effect on U.S. commerce is
more direct. And, even if such activity does not rise to the level of a
violation of the United States antitrust laws, any U.S. manufacturer or
exporter imposing such restrictions on foreign distributors must beware
of liability under foreign law.70
IV. Refusals to Deal
Provided that the requisite effect on U.S. commerce exists, the legal-
ity of domestic and foreign commerce refusals to deal under the U.S.
antitrust laws appears to be the same.
A. Domestic Refusals to Deal
Under U.S. domestic precedents,7 1 unilateral refusals to deal are
lawful provided that the refusing party is not a monopolist and is not
attempting to enforce some other anti-competitive practice, such as a tie-
in,72 reciprocal dealing, 73 market allocation 74 or price fixing.75 The
existence of valid business purposes for such refusals, such as the substitu-
tion of distributors, 76 has been recognized in these cases.
On the other hand, concerted refusals to deal are illegal per se under
U.S. domestic law, whether horizontal or vertical. 77 In the vertical con-
text, however, a certain relaxation of the standard is evidenced, particu-
larly with regard to substitutions of distributors. 78
B. Foreign Refusals to Deal
A unilateral refusal to deal with a U.S. buyer by a foreign seller has
69 See notes 55 and 56 supra.
70 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 46; Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission, (1966)
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 429, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046.
71 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Cream of Wheat, 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
72 Osborne v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963
(1961); Bragen v. Hudson County News Co., 278 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1960).
73 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
74 United States v. Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., [1972] Trade Cases (CCH) 73,889 (D.
Conn. 1972).
75 Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Sahm v. V-I Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69
(10th Cir. 1968); Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 350 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1965).
76 Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers
Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997; Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970).
77 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Kors, Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
78 See note 76 supra.
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been adjudged lawful in one case. 79 Presumably, the foreign seller was
not a monopolist and, therefore, the result is consistent with domestic
precedents.
Concerted refusals to deal in foreign commerce, whether horizontal
or vertical, have been held to be illegal per se. 80 The Department of Jus-
tice supports this position in its Guide."'
A recent area of antitrust concern relating to this issue has been the
Arab boycott. Consistent with domestic antitrust law, the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments of 197782 have permitted refusals to deal con-
nected with the Arab boycott, provided that such specification of
suppliers is unilateral. 8 3 Although it is often very difficult to maintain
that such selections were truly unilateral, both the antitrust law and the
Export Administration Amendments recognize that such a distinction is
necessary.
V. Reciprocal Dealing
The illegality of reciprocal dealing, or the use of monopsony
purchasing power to promote sales, is distinguished in domestic and for-
eign commerce transactions only by the effect on U.S. commerce.
A. Domestic Reciprocal Deaihg
Reciprocal dealing in domestic transactions had been held to be ille-
gal per se.8 4
B. Foreign Commerce Reciprocal Dealing
In import transactions, where the foreign buyer attempts to use its
purchasing power to promote sales to the American purchaser, there
would appear to be the requisite adverse effect on U.S. commerce in that
the American purchaser would lose its freedom to purchase from compet-
itive sources.
In export transactions, where the American buyer attempts to use its
purchasing power to promote sales to a foreign purchaser, such agree-
ments would foreclose the foreign purchaser as a market to the U.S. com-
petitors of the American seller. Although it is less likely that the
79 Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
80 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Hamburg-Amerrhanriche
P.F.A.G., 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), revtdon other ground, 239 U.S. 466 (1916); United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Van Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. Diamond Dealers Club,
Inc., [1955] Trade Cases (CCH) 67,987.
81 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case K at 50.
82 50 U.S.C.A. § 2403-la (West Supp. 1978) (amending the Export Administration Act of
1969, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401-13 (1976)).
83 Id. § 2403-1a(a)(2)(c).
84 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); FTC v.
Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); FTC v. Waugh Equipment Co., 15 F.T.C. 232
(1931).
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foreclosure of such a market would be substantial, if it were it would
result in an illegal restraint.
VI. Tying
The distinction between the application of the antitrust laws to do-
mestic tying and tying in foreign commerce depends upon the effect on
U.S. commerce.
A. Domestic Tying
Tying may be attacked both under section 1 of the Sherman Act8 5
and section 3 of the Clayton Act.8 6 In either case, the conduct is illegal
per se provided that the requisite effect on commerce is present.8 7 The
courts have created separate standards for tying under each act. Under
section 3 of the Clayton Act, the defendant must have a monopolistic
position in the market for the tying product, or a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied product must be restrained.8 8 Under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, if the seller has sufficient economic power to control
prices or impose other burdensome terms with respect to an appreciable
number of buyers, and a not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in
the tied product is affected, then a violation results.8 9
Domestically, the courts have recognized a limited defense for a new
entrant into an "infant industry." In United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp. ,90 the defendant tied service contracts to the sale of cable television
systems. The Court stated that for a limited period of time when there
were not competent servicemen available in the new industry that the
tying restraint was reasonable.
B. T~yzg in Foreign Commerce
In an import transaction, where a foreign seller conditions the sale
of its products to the U.S. buyer on the purchase of a tied product, a
restraint which is illegal per se would result. This tying restricts the U.S.
purchaser's freedom of choice and denies the U.S. purchaser the right to
select its seller.
In export transactions, where the U.S. seller is tying products in its
sales to foreign countries, section 3 of the Clayton Act is not applicable. 9 '
85 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
86 Id. § 14.
87 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947).
88 332 U.S. at 608-09.
89 356 U.S. at 6; 332 U.S. at 396.
90 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afdpercuriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
91 "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act is applicable, but there must be the requi-
site adverse effect on U.S. commerce for a violation to result.
The Department of Justice in its Guide refers to export tying transac-
tions.92 It provides that "the Department would be unlikely to seek to
invoke U.S. antitrust enforcement jurisdiction absent a belief in the case
that it had some significant effect on overseas license opportunities for
U.S. firms or some impact on sales in the United States."19 3 It also states
that U.S. source tying is preferred, viz., if the American seller conditions
the sale of its products on the purchase of U.S. products, as opposed to
the seller's products alone, the Department of Justice would have no ob-
jection.94 However, it is important to realize that such export tying may
be a violation of foreign law if personal jurisdiction can be obtained in
the foreign country over the U.S. seller.95
VII. Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing, or an agreement by a buyer to purchase exclu-
sively from the seller, such as in a requirements contract, may be a viola-
tion of section 3 of the Clayton Act 96 (which is limited to tangible goods),
or section 1 of the Sherman Act9 7 (which reaches services). A compari-
son of the domestic exclusive dealing cases and foreign commerce exclu-
sive dealing cases demonstrates that the illegality depends upon
differences in effect on U.S. commerce.
A. Domestic Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing in the domestic cases has been judged under the
rule of reason.98 The basic test has been the amount of market foreclo-
sure which has occurred, i.e., the amount of sales opportunity which is
lost by the competitors of the seller.
B Foreign Commerce Exclusi've Dealing
As in the domestic cases, exclusive dealing in foreign commerce has
been judged by the rule of reason. 99 In import transactions, where the
buyer is in the United States, sufficient effect on U.S. foreign commerce
within the United States or any territog, thereof or the District of Columbia or any inular possession or other
place under thejurisdiction of the United States. (emphasis added), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1977).
92 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case G at 37.
93 Id. at 39.
94 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case F at 35.
95 Treaty of Rome, supra note 46, arts. 85(1), 86; Gema, Commission Decision of June 21,
1971,J.O.L. 134/6, CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9438, amendedby Commission Decision of July
6, 1972, J.O.L. 166/22, COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9521.
96 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
97 Id. § 1.
98 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), rev'd., 339 F.2d 45
(8th Cir. 1964), rev'd., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
99 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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is more likely to be found due to the restriction on the U.S. buyer as to
where it can buy its goods and services.
In export transactions the effect on U.S. commerce depends upon
the amount of the market foreclosed to competitors of the U.S. seller.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is not applicable because that section is
confined to sales in the United States, 100 but section 1 of the Sherman
Act would continue to be applicable, both for tangible goods and serv-
ices. The Department of Justice in its Guide10 1 indicates that the legality
of export exclusive dealing will depend upon whether it is illegal under
foreign law, and whether there is another less restrictive alternative avail-
able.
VIII. Price Discrimination
Substantial differences exist between the application of the Robin-
son-Patman Act 10 2 regarding price discrimination in domestic and for-
eign commerce transactions due to the differences in jurisdictional
language in the Robinson-Patman Act.
A. Domestic Price Discrimination
Under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Act, it is unlawful to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. 0 3 Under section
2(c) it is unlawful to grant brokerage or commissions except for services
rendered. 10 4 Sections 2(d) and 2(e) prohibit the granting of discrimina-
tory promotional and/or advertising allowances or services.' 0 5
B Foreign Commerce Price Discrimination
In regard to import transactions, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. ,106 the court ruled that in order for section 2(a) of the Act
to apply, both sales must be within the United States. Therefore, dis-
crimination in prices by a foreign seller between sales in its home market
and sales to a U.S. purchaser are not covered by section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Where a foreign seller makes two sales into the
United States at discriminatory prices, however, the requirements of sec-
tion 2(a) are met.
In further regard to import sales, a little-utilized provision, the Rev-
enue Act of 1916,107 does prohibit import sales at prices to the United
100 See note 91 supra.
101 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, Case J at 47 n.80.
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1976).
103 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
104 Id. § 13(c).
105 Id. §§ 13(d), (e).
106 402 F. Supp. 244, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
107 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976). This Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any articles
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States market which are lower than the prices at which sales are made in
the foreign market. The Antidumping Act of 1921,108 also applies to
such activity and will result in additional customs duties if such conduct
occurs and injury results. Unlike the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no
specific provision for meeting competition or cost justification defenses
under the Antidumping Act of 1921. However, the Secretary of Treas-
ury can make allowances for different circumstances of sale.109
In export sales, section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act has been
held not to apply,"10 since the sales of commodities must be "for use,
consumption or resale within the United States" or "other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States." '11 1 Similarly, a sale in the United
States to a U.S. buyer for resale abroad is not covered by the Act.
However, this export exception to section 2(a) of the Act has been
held not to apply to sections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) of the Act due to the
differences in jurisdictional language.' 12 Sales at a price to the foreign
country which are lower than the price at which sales are made in the
U.S. market may be "dumping" under foreign law. Obviously, sales to a
foreign market at a price higher than that which is charged in the home
market would not be a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, but it may
be a violation of foreign law.
IX. Monopolization
In addition to section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 2 of the Sher-
man Act 1 3 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or con-
spiracies to monopolize. One of the activities which has been considered
as conduct constituting an attempt to monopolize is predatory pricing. "1
4
Domestically, very recently a number of courts have adopted the Areeda-
from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to
import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States
at a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of
such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal
markets of the country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which
they are commonly exported, after adding to such market value or wholesale
price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the
importation and sale thereof in the United States: Arovded, that such act or acts
be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States,
or preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or restraining
or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United
States.
Companion bills to amend this Act to make it much easier for actions to be brought are
now pending in the Senate and House of Representatives, S.223, H.R.2597.
108 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1976).
109 19 C.F.R. § 153.9 (1978).
11o Fimex Corp. v. Barmatic Products Co., 429 F. Supp. 978 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), afd mem.,
573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977).
111 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
112 Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio
1964); Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
"13 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
114 [1962] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 70,401 (D.C.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Wallace &
Tiernon Co., [1954] Trade Cases (CCH) 67,828, 67,901 (D.R.I. 1954).
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Turner thesis,'" 5 that predatory pricing cannot exist without proof of
sales below marginal or average variable cost. 116 This issue is now before
Judge Becker in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a foreign com-
merce context in the case of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. 117 The plaintiff has alleged that the foreign defendants combined
and conspired through predatory pricing to attempt to monopolize the
U.S. market. The defendants have argued that no such conduct oc-
curred and that such conduct in the context of foreign commerce is irra-
tional.
X. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
In addition to the antitrust laws already mentioned, the Tariff Act
of 1930, section 337,118 also prohibits "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States."
Thus, by its definition, the Act has no application to domestic commerce
and is limited to import transactions in foreign commerce.
This section has been broadly utilized by the International Trade
Commission to inquire into many traditional antitrust-types of offenses.
For example, conspiracy, price fixing, refusals to deal, resale price main-
tenance, market allocations and price discrimination have all been inves-
tigated under this section."t 9 Investigations under this Act are initiated
by the International Trade Commission upon a petition filed by a U.S.
business. '
2 0
XI. Conclusion
The antitrust laws and other related laws clearly apply to transac-
tions in the marketing of goods in export and import foreign trade. Dif-
ferences in application of the laws occur due to the differences in
115 Areeda & Turner, Predatov Pricing and Related Practices under Section Two ofthe Sherman Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
116 Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 103 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551
F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); William Inglis
& Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. International Business Machines, Corp., No. C-73-1832
RHS (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1978); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business
Machines, Corp., 458 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Murphy Tugboat Corp. v. Crowley, 454 F.
Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., Civil No. F
74-137 (N.D. Ind., filed Mar. 30, 1978); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1977).
117 Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 189 [1979-21 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 62,753, 62,893 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
118 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
119 Certain Electronic and Related Equipment, No. 337-TA-7 (1976); Certain Welded
Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, No. 337-TA-29 (1978); Certain Ceramic Tilesetters, No. 337-TA-
41 (1978); Chicory Root-Crude and Prepared, No. 337-TA-27 (1976); Monolithic Catalytic
Converters, No. 337-TA-18 (1976); Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, Inc., No. 337-TA-16
(1976).
120 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 210.10 (1979).
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jurisdictional language of the various laws and the differing effects on
U.S. commerce of specific transactions. Particularly, export transactions
may have less adverse effect on U.S. commerce, and, therefore, less likeli-
hood of violating U.S. law. However, such transactions may, under for-
eign law, be prohibited.
When engaging in any foreign trade transaction, the participant
must consider the two guideposts of antitrust enforcement in foreign
trade: first, whether the agreement or conduct will result in a limitation
or restriction to the U.S. consuming public of foreign goods or services or
a limitation on a U.S. business to obtain goods and services from its
freely-chosen source; and second, whether the agreement or conduct will
result in a limitation of a U.S. business competitor's ability to sell his
products or services abroad.1 2 1
Fortunately, to the extent that one can be made a defendant under
such laws, they are equally available to protect American business
against anti-competitive conduct by their own U.S. competitors or by
their foreign competitors.
Question and Answer Period
Question: Is the doctrine of full line forcing an important considera-
tion or is it a simple tie in?
Mr. Johnson: Full line forcing is when a manufacturer or distributor
tells the distributor or dealer that he wants him to take the entire line.
Last month I was doing some work on this particular question, and I
found four reported cases on this point. Two of them said that that kind
of activity would be a per se violation of the antitrust laws similar to
tying. Two cases said it would not be. The conclusion that I reached
based on reading those facts is that if you can show some particular rea-
son why it's important that the distributor or dealer take the full line of
your product then it might be justifiable. It depends upon the circum-
stances. Otherwise, you cannot force them to take your full line. One
case which permitted such forcing was United States v. Jerrold Electronics.1
In that case cable TV was involved. It was a new industry, an infant
industry, and Jerrold was able to argue that during this time when the
industry was getting started it was important to them to use only equip-
ment and components which they provided because other people did not
know how to produce them, or manufacture them, and because use of
other products resulted in an inefficient system. So they were able to
argue that successfully. In United States v.1 I Case2 the judge concluded
121 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 6, at 4-5.
I United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af dper
curtim, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See notes 63 and 90 supra and accompanying text.
2 United States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
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that the buyer was not really coerced, but agreed to take the full line,
and therefore there was no full line forcing and no violation of the law.
Question: Can a manufacturer selling highly specialized equipment
require as a condition that the purchaser buy maintenance services from
the manufacturer for a period exceeding the warranty period?
Mr. Johnson: Definitely not in California. There's a law there called
the Song-Beverly Act 3 which prohibits the sale of any good on which you
require the purchaser to use your maintenance services. This also may
be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act depending again upon
whether they're really required or whether you can show theJerroldElec-
tronics exception that there's some special reason why your maintenance
services are superior or important as opposed to an alternate supplier of
services. Finally, I would say that if you require those maintenance serv-
ices to extend beyond the warranty period, you will definitely have a
violation of the law.
Question: Would you please expand on the elements and use of the
Revenue Act of 1916?
Mr. Johnson: This is the Act that provides a private right of action
for dumping in the United States. There are three cases in which it's
being used presently. One is the Zenith4 case in my article. There's also
OutboardMarine Corp. v. Pezetel,5 the Polish Golfcart case. The third case,
which was filed out in District Court in Oregon, Cascade Steel Rollng Mdlls
v. C Itoh & Co. ,6 charges dumping of Japanese steel. One interesting
thing about that particular case is that the defendants argued that the
1916 Act was not really an antitrust act and there should be a shorter
statute of limitations applied of one year. The court ruled that this act
was more like an antitrust act than like any other type of statute and
therefore the four year statue of limitations applied. The elements of a
cause of action under the Act are that you must commonly and systemat-
ically import or cause to be imported articles into the United States at a
price substantially below their wholesale price or their actual market
value in the home market with the intent of injuring the U.S. industry.
Some of those elements are very difficult to meet. For example, proof
that the importation was done with the intent of injuring someone is
extremely difficult. Also, what is a substantially lower price? And third,
what is commonly and systematically? All of those hurdles have to be
3 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 el seq. (West 1979).
4 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litigation, M.D.L. No. 189 [1979-21 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,753, 62,893 (E.D. Pa.
1979). See notes 106 and 117 supra and accompanying text.
5 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, [1979-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,792 (D. Del.
1979).
6 Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., Civ. No. 78-875 (D.C. Ore., filed
Sept. 28, 1978).
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overcome for a plaintiff to be successful. As you can see by the cases
which have begun to use this Act, there is more and more interest on the
part of American firms in trying to utilize all of its features.
